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Shadow Banking in Europe:  






This paper studies the specificities of the regulation of shadow banking in Europe. It argues that the 
idiosyncratic features of the EU shadow banking sector call for a different (or indigenized) regulatory 
approach from that of the US. It highlights striking differences between the EU and the US shadow banking 
sectors based on both market structure and legal micro-infrastructure of the shadow banking sectors in these 
two jurisdictions. These different institutional and legal infrastructures of the shadow banking activities, 
instruments, and entities, as well as the different trajectories in the evolution of the banking and shadow 
banking sectors in terms of business models, size and composition of actors and transactions can be the 
driving force behind the differential regulatory treatment of shadow banking in the EU and the US. 
In highlighting the differences between shadow banking across the Atlantic, this paper focuses on the repo 
markets, as the main instruments and activities that play a significant role in credit intermediation outside 
the regulatory perimeter of the traditional or regular banking system. It then discusses one specific segment 
of the shadow banking entities, i.e., Money Market Funds (MMFs), and highlights the fundamental 
differences in the structure, functioning, and existing regulatory treatment of the MMFs in the US and the 
EU. The paper concludes that the market structure, business models, as well as legacy legal and regulatory 
frameworks of shadow banking (as well as banking) display substantial differences in the US and the EU. 
The findings in this paper rally against one-size-fits-all approaches to addressing the problems of the 
shadow banking system worldwide and recommends differentiated and more nuanced regulatory 
approaches to regulating shadow banking across the Atlantic. By implication, any adoption of the US 
regulatory framework or recommendations of international fora for the shadow banking sector by the EU 
regulatory authorities should not overlook these differences. 
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 2 
Introduction 
Despite the significant role of shadow banking in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),1 and heavy 
involvement by regulators to curb its risks, the concept of shadow banking remains imprecise and elusive. 
The lack of a precise definition is a potential source of a whole host of problems, including imprecise 
measurement of shadow banking in different jurisdictions.2 For practical purposes, in this paper we define 
shadow banking by its function, i.e., the role it plays in the economy and the risks it poses to the financial 
system. In this view, shadow banking can best be understood as undertaking financial intermediation 
(credit, maturity and liquidity transformation) outside the banking regulatory perimeter and without access 
to government safety nets (e.g., deposit insurance, lender of last resort). Shadow banking activities can be 
undertaken either by banking institutions engaging in shadow banking activities or by any other institution 
(non-banks) engaging in financial intermediation often using financial instruments lying outside the scope 
of government safety nets (e.g., repos and certain derivatives).3 
In this view, shadow banking is a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. It is a combination of 
activities, instruments and entities that would collectively pose greater risks than they would each in 
isolation. But the paradox is that the whole, as an elusive and slippery concept, does not lend itself to the 
governance of legal rules, and it is only the constituent parts of the whole that can be captured by legal 
provisions. This is why we rarely see any reference to shadow banking in laws and regulations. Instead, the 
references to each segment of the shadow banking sector abound in legal and statutory texts. By the same 
token, instead of focusing on the macro-level analysis of the shadow banking sector, this article studies the 
micro-level distinctions in the structure and legal treatment of the shadow banking in the US and the EU. 
The overarching rationale for regulating shadow banking is the concerns about systemic risk.4 Systemic 
risk in the shadow banking sector can materialize either directly or indirectly. Directly, systemic risk 
originates from credit intermediation (maturity and liquidity transformation), leverage and imperfect credit 
risk transfer,5 and indirectly through the interconnectedness of the shadow banking system with the 
                                                      
1 Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
2 See for example, Christophe Duclos and Romuald Morhs, "Analysis on the Shadow Banking Content of Captive Financial 
Companies in Luxembourg," (Luxembourg: Banque Centrale du Luxembourg, Comité du Risque Systémique, 2017). The 
definition in the shadow banking is of special significance because if not properly defined, it can create a whole host of problems 
in the collection of data on shadow banking. For example, there are huge discrepancies in the available data on shadow banking 
the majority of which have their roots in the different approaches taken to define shadow banking. 
3 For different approaches to the definition of shadow banking see Hossein Nabilou and Alessio Pacces, "The Law and Economics 
of Shadow Banking," in Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory Aspects, ed. Iris H. Chiu and Iain G. 
MacNeil (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2018).; International Monetary Fund, "Global Financial Stability Report: 
Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess While Promoting Growth," (Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund, October 2014). 
4 Eddy Wymeersch, "Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk," European Banking Institute Working Paper Series No. 1 (2017). 
5 Viral V. Acharya, Philipp Schnabl, and Gustavo Suarez, "Securitization without Risk Transfer," Journal of Financial Economics 
107, no. 3 (2013). 
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traditional banking system.6 Following the systemic risk logic for regulating the shadow banking system, 
this study focuses on the parts of the shadow banking sector that are likely to create or contribute to systemic 
risk. 
In exploring the specificities of the shadow banking in the EU compared to its US counterpart, we first 
focus on the securities financing markets and underline the distinguishing features of the European repo 
markets from its US counterpart. Second, we focus on shadow banking entities and in particular on money 
market funds (MMFs) and analyze the structure of such funds and highlight their differences and the 
implications of such distinctive features to MMF regulatory regime in Europe. Due to limitations of time 
and space, securitization, derivatives markets and other non-banks engaging in shadow banking activities 
will remain outside the scope of this paper. 
International initiatives to regulate shadow banking 
The shadow banking system, as part of the broader financial ecosystem, has evolved differently in different 
jurisdictions. For example, in developing countries shadow banking has emerged significantly differently 
from the shadow banking system in developed countries.7 The main contention of this paper is that 
idiosyncrasies in the development of the shadow banking system exist in various jurisdictions in the western 
hemisphere as well. This has been the case despite the international efforts to harmonize the shadow 
banking instruments such as repos. Therefore, this paper aims at underlining such differences that require 
a differential regulatory treatment in the two main shadow banking jurisdictions, i.e., the EU and the US.8 
The focus of international efforts and transatlantic regulatory reforms have been on addressing the fragility 
of the shadow banking system by regulating the liquidity and leverage and incentivizing financial 
institutions to reduce their leverage, improve their liquidity conditions, and specifically reduce their reliance 
on short-term wholesale funding. At the international level, the main regulatory initiatives on the reforms 
of the shadow banking sector are carried out by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). In 2011, the FSB put 
                                                      
6 See, for example, Financial Stability Board, "Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, a Background Note of the Financial Stability 
Board," (2011), 4. 
7 Viral V. Acharya, Hemal Khandwala, and T. Sabri Öncü, "The Growth of a Shadow Banking System in Emerging Markets: 
Evidence from India," Journal of International Money and Finance 39 (2013). 
See also Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo, and İnci Ötker-Robe, "Chasing the Shadows: How Significant Is Shadow Banking 
in Emerging Markets?," The World Bank- Economic Premise, no. 88 (2012). 
8 The differential transatlantic trajectories taken by the shadow banking sector is not only due to the differences in the legal systems 
and financial regulation, but also due to economic reasons (e.g., supply and demand for shadow-banking products and services due 
to local specificities, and different needs of consumers). However, this paper is to highlight the difference in the shadow banking 
in the EU and the US based on the legal infrastructure and regulatory treatment of the institutions and instruments that are generally 
perceived to belong to shadow banking entities or instruments. 
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forward five overarching principles and work streams to identify and regulate the key risks in the shadow 
banking system.9 These work streams include:  
1. Indirect regulation or regulating banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities to limit spillovers 
between regulated banks and shadow banks; 
2. Regulatory reform of MMFs to reduce the risk of runs on MMFs;10 
3. Regulation of other shadow banking entities to identify the potential systemic risks of the new 
shadow banking entities; 
4. Regulation of securitization to align incentives in the securitization transactions; 
5. Regulation of securities lending and repos – and addressing the risks and procyclicality of such 
activities and instruments.11 
The FSB and other international fora have been criticized for imposing their policy priorities to all 
jurisdictions without due regard to the idiosyncrasies of different markets all around the globe. In particular, 
Chinese legal scholars have been critical of the international initiatives for the regulation of the shadow 
banking sector and have claimed that the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
as global standard setters, have ignored the nuances of local markets.12 In this paper, we highlight significant 
differences, both regarding market structure and regulatory regime, in the seemingly similar EU and US 
shadow banking sector to put a spotlight on such differences and attract international standard setters’ 
attention to such idiosyncrasies. A close examination of the existing recommendations, preparatory works 
                                                      
9 See Financial Stability Board, "Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation-- Recommedations of the Financial 
Stability Board," (2011). See also "Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities," (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
10 The FSB’s work on addressing the risks of the asset management industry is particularly focused on addressing the mismatch 
between the liquidity of a fund’s investments and redemption terms for funds. It is further concerned with the leverage within the 
investment fund industry, operational risks associated with transferring investment mandates in stressed conditions, and securities 
lending activities of asset managers and funds. See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review (May 2016), 106-08. 
11 See Board, "Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation-- Recommedations of the Financial Stability Board." See 
also "Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation 
of Shadow Banking Entities." 
12 Robin Hui Huang, "Shadow Banking and Its Regulation: The Case of China," in Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its 
Regulation, ed. Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas, and Douglas W. Arner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 348. 
It appears that China is not unique in its shadow banking being different from the rest of the Western economies. In neighboring 
India, it is also found that unlike western economies where the growth of the shadow banking sector is driven by a desire to mitigate 
counterparty risks by providing ‘safe’ collateral for financial transactions, or for the purposes of regulatory arbitrage, the shadow 
banking sector is a substitute for direct lending by banks in non-urban India. See Acharya, Khandwala, and Sabri Öncü, "The 
Growth of a Shadow Banking System in Emerging Markets: Evidence from India."; Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, "Securitization 
without Risk Transfer." (They find that securitization vehicles are mainly motivated by and used for regulatory arbitrage.) 
See also Yingmao Tang, "Shadow Banking or "Bank's Shadow": Reconceptualising Global Shadow Banking Regulation," in 
Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation, ed. Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas, and Douglas W. Arner (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 329, 37-38.; William Blair, "Reconceptualizing the Role of Standards in Supporting Financial 
Regulation," ibid., 445-46. 
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and decision-making mechanisms within such international fora suggests that international financial fora 
are largely cognizant of such differences and in many instances take such specificities into account, 
however, familiarity with these idiosyncrasies would benefit not only international standard setters, but also 
national regulators responsible for implementing such guidelines and recommendations in their specific 
jurisdictions. Therefore, there is still a need for a nuanced tone for international fora as their 
recommendations set standards towards which almost all national regulators anchor, particularly those 
regulators with limited regulatory resources. 
For example, in 2012, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recommended 
the conversion of Constant Net Asset Value Money Market Funds (CNAV MMFs) to Variable Net Asset 
Value Money Market Funds (VNAV MMFs).13 It further recommended that if such a conversion proves to 
be impossible, safeguards should be in place to reinforce CNAV MMFs’ resilience in the event of 
significant redemptions. The FSB also joined forces with the IOSCO in supporting the idea that in the event 
of the impossibility of the conversion of CNAV to VNAV funds, requirements that are functionally 
equivalent to capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements that protect banks against runs on their 
deposits should be in place for CNAV MMFs.14 These two international fora also supported imposing 
reserve requirements on MMFs and risk-retention requirements for the suppliers of securitization (e.g., 
originator, sponsors).15 As we shall see in the next sections many of the such proposals were wanting in 
their theoretical substance as well as empirical evidence. 
The proposal for conversion of CNAV funds to VNAV funds has received a lukewarm support from the 
very first day and eventually neither jurisdictions adopted it. The proposal for imposing reserve 
requirements (so called ‘NAV buffer’) faced strong resistance from the industry and was eventually 
dropped. However, the policy diverged in the case of sponsor support. In the EU, the European regulators 
preferred to put a ban on sponsor support, while the US regulator opted for a more nuanced approach; 
allowing such support but imposing transparency requirements. The proposals put forward on 
securitization, which is mainly about retention requirements, despite being adopted in the EU and the US, 
perhaps was not necessary as many originators have already retained more than the required risks in the 
securitization positions.16 
                                                      
13 International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), "Policy Recommendations for Money Market Funds," (October 
2012). 
14 Financial Stability Board, "Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Integrated Overview of Policy 
Recommendations," (Basel: Financial Stability Board, 18 November 2012). 
15 "Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation: Recommedations of the Financial Stability Board," (2011).  
16 See for example, Paul Willen, "Mandated Risk Retention in Mortgage Securitization: An Economist's View," American Economic 
Review 104, no. 5 (2014). 
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In addition to the efforts of the international fora, self-regulatory organizations as well as industry 
associations have played a significant role in the legal treatment of the shadow banking instruments and 
activities. These players have a rather different approach compared to international fora. Unlike the 
international fora, which focus on the mitigating risk to the financial system in the aggregate and at macro-
level, these associations focus on the harmonization of shadow banking instruments at the micro-level (e.g., 
contract design, bankruptcy protections, etc.) inspired by the commercial and financial customs and 
practices already in place. For example, efforts to standardize and harmonize the transactions largely used 
in the shadow banking sector have been underway well before the GFC. Industry initiatives through self-
regulatory organizations, such as International Capital Market Association (ICMA), Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), and International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
have been relatively successful in achieving certain degrees of standardization in the design, governance, 
and regulation of such transactions. The ICMA (and its predecessor institutions) played a significant role 
in pushing governments to pass laws that grant bankruptcy safe harbors to repos and certain types of 
derivatives with certain counterparties. However, despite such efforts toward standardization, many 
transactions used in the shadow banking system remain subject to local rules and regulations of specific 
jurisdictions. This is the case especially in Europe where those transactions are still governed and regulated 
by the Member State laws, subject to varying degrees of harmonization.  In the next section, we present the 
root causes of such subtle idiosyncrasies that drive the divergence in the shadow banking systems of Europe 
and the US. 
Specificities of the shadow banking in the EU: a long divergence 
At the roots of the differences in the EU and US shadow banking system lies deeper structural differences 
in the financial market within these two jurisdictions.17 There are at least two significant contributing factors 
to the divergent paths of the evolution of shadow banking on either side of the Atlantic. The first is related 
to the fact that, roughly speaking, Europe has a bank-based financial system18 and the US has a market-
                                                      
17 A word of caution is in order at this very outset. In comparing the shadow banking in the EU and the U.S., one should bear in 
mind that the EU is not composed of homogenous financial markets and intuitions. Instead, there is a large variety of heterogeneous 
institutions in various jurisdictions; some with close similarities to the U.S. markets, some a far cry from it. For example, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) (2014) and ESRB 2016 report suggests, there is a wide variety of treatment of non-bank 
financial institutions across EU Member States. See: European Banking Authority, "Report to the European Commission on the 
Perimeter of Credit Institutions Established in the Member States," (London27 November 2014).  
This adds to the complexity of comparing the shadow banking sector in these two jurisdictions and provides a compelling argument 
for a differential regulatory treatment of shadow banking in the EU compared to the US. 
18 Ross Levine, "Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?," Journal of Financial Intermediation 11, no. 
4 (2002). See also European Commission, "Economic Analysis Accompanying the Document Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union," Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2015), 18-25. 
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based one.19 The second concerns the banking business model across the Atlantic. Namely, European 
financial markets are dominated by universal banks, while the modern US banking has been characterized 
with the separation of the investment banking from the commercial banking model, largely emerged after 
the great depression by the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act.20  
To highlight the role of bank-based vs. market based financial system, the data on the liabilities side of the 
EU and US corporate sector’s balance sheet is very much revealing. In the bank-based financial markets of 
Europe, data from 2013 suggest that 14% of the total liabilities of European companies is made up of bank 
loans. To the contrary, in the US, the share of bank loans in total liabilities of companies stands at 3%. 
Equally importantly, 11% of the total liabilities of US companies are in the form of corporate bonds, 
compared to 4% in the European companies.21 
 
                                                      
19 Levine, "Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?." 
20 Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, Universal Banking in the United States: What Could We Gain? What Could We Lose? (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).; Hossein Nabilou, "Can the Plight of the European Banking Structural Reforms Be a 
Blessing in Disguise?," SSRN Working Paper Series  (2019). 
21 Commission, "Economic Analysis Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Action Plan on Building 
a Capital Markets Union," 18-25. The difference between bank-based and market-based financial systems even shapes the 
mechanisms of central bank interventions in financial markets in the recent financial crisis (quantitative easing). See Brett W 
Fawley and Christopher J Neely, "Four Stories of Quantitative Easing," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 95, no. 1 (2013). 
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Against this background, in the European setting, one of the objectives of regulating shadow banking as 
part of the broader Action Plan on building a Capital Markets Union22 is to promote market finance and 
reduce the real economy’s reliance on the banking sector, which is traditionally the dominant and primary 
medium of channeling funds from surplus spending units to deficit spending ones. In this context, shadow 
banking is viewed as a market-based finance and is often encouraged as it provides alternative sources of 
finance to the real economy and exerts a competitive pressure on the banking sector.23 
The second important factor that plays a major role in distinguishing the European shadow banking from 
the US shadow banking is rooted in the structure of the banking industry or banking business models, which 
is embodied in the dichotomy of universal banking vs. separation of commercial and investment banking 
models in these two jurisdictions. If we define shadow banking as non-bank financial intermediation,24 in 
a universal banking model there is a wider scope for banks to engage in shadow banking activities. This 
means that in those jurisdictions where the dominant banking business model is universal banking, one 
would expect greater interconnectedness between banks and shadow banks. For example, in the universal 
banking model, since many financial activities can be performed under a single entity, it is more likely for 
the banking industry to engage in shadow banking operations through sponsoring MMFs, offering prime 
brokerages services, or through undertaking broker-dealer functions.25 
This problem is especially acute in the bank sponsorship of MMFs in the EU, giving rise to higher levels 
of interconnectedness of the European MMFs to banks.26 Typically, MMFs are managed by asset 
management companies. Asset management companies are either sponsored by banks or run MMFs 
independently. In the euro area, more than 50% of large asset management companies are owned by banks 
or bank holding companies.27 Although roughly the same figures apply for the US MMFs,28 it is estimated 
                                                      
22 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM/2015/0468 final. 
23 In addition to the regulatory efforts to encourage the market-based finance, shadow banking owes its growth to market forces, 
financial innovation, and technological developments. For an overview, see: André Prüm, In the Shadow of the Banks (Cowansville 
(Québec): Thomson Reuters, 2014), 15-18.  
24 For example, in FSB’s view, the shadow banking system is a system of credit intermediation involving activities and institutions 
outside the traditional banking system. See Financial Stability Board, "Progress in the Implementation of the G20 
Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central  Bank Governors," (2011). 
25 For how and why dealers are considered as part of the shadow banking system, see Zoltan Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money 
View," Office of Financial Research Working Paper  (2014).; See also Darrell Duffie, "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks.";  
26 Elias Bengtsson, "Shadow Banking and Financial Stability: European Money Market Funds in the Global Financial Crisis," 
Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013). 
27 10% of the asset management companies in the euro area are owned by insurance companies. See Nicola Doyle et al., "Shadow 
Banking in the Euro Area: Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Investment Fund Sector," ECB Occasional Paper Series, no. 174 (June 
2016): 21.  
28 Jill E. Fisch, "The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money Market Fund Reform," North Carolina Law 
Review 93 (2014): 944. 
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that 9 out of 10 biggest EU MMF managers are sponsored by commercial banks.29 As evidence suggests 
funds sponsored by banks with more MMFs under their sponsorship tend to take on more risk.30 This would 
result in a direct contagion channel between MMFs and sponsoring banks in the event of stress in the MMF 
industry. 
Shadow banking activities 
The specificities of the shadow banking system in the EU are also present in the financial activities typically 
associated with shadow banking. The differences are present in securities financing transactions (including 
repos (bilateral vs. tri-party repo) and securities lending31), securitization, and derivatives markets.32 One 
of the targets of regulation therefore was repo transactions, and the FSB, which champions the international 
initiatives for regulating shadow banking, issued recommendations regarding such transactions. A careful 
examination of the market structure and legal structure of the repo markets in the EU and the US reveals 
their foundational differences and raises doubts about whether a one-size-fits-all approach is the right path 
to take in regulating securities financing transactions.33 We will discuss this issue in the next section. 
Securities financing transactions: What is special about the European markets? 
The largest European banks obtain collateral using Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs) rather than 
using derivatives.34 Repo transactions constitute the main type of SFTs in the EU, which makes it the main 
mechanism through which banks acquire short-term wholesale funding.35 The vulnerabilities in the 
wholesale funding and in particular short-term (overnight) repo markets were a significant source of 
                                                      
29 European Commission, "New Rules for Money Market Funds Proposed – Frequently Asked Questions," (Brussles4 September 
2013). 
30 Marcin Kacperczyk and Philipp Schnabl, "How Safe Are Money Market Funds?*," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, 
no. 3 (2013). For the concept of step-in risk and the approach that the BCBS has proposed to take on capital treatment of step-in 
risk, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Identification and Management of Step-in Risk - Second Consultative 
Document," (2017). 
31 In the securities lending, the lender passes the legal title of securities to the borrower for the life of the loan. When securities are 
returned to the lender, the lender again regains the title to the loan. During the lending period, even though the lender does not have 
legal title to the securities lent, the economic benefits of corporate actions (stock splits, income and dividends) will accrue to the 
lender. However, in case of equity securities, the lender will not retain voting rights of the securities it has lent for the duration of 
the term of the loan. 
32 Such difference also exists in trading venues, on which standardized derivatives must be traded, and clearing houses and central 
securities depositories through which those transactions must be cleared and settled. However, this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
33 See Wymeersch, "Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk," 19. 
34 The data on collateral flows show that the at the beginning of 2013, the gross collateral flows (collateral posted and received) 
though repos amounted to €5.8 trillion, whereas collateral flows through derivatives stood at €340 billion. The total gross collateral 
flows stood at €8.5 trillion. 6. See Table 2 of Keller et al. (2014). See European Systemic Risk Board, "Esrb Opinion to Esma on 
Securities Financing Transactions and Leverage under Article 29 of the Sftr," (2016). 
35 Ibid., 7. 
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systemic risk in the GFC.36. In addition to maturity and liquidity transformation, repo transactions allow for 
financial leverage with varying degrees depending on the level of haircut or initial margin.37 Since credit 
intermediation using repos is outside the government safety net, repos are vulnerable to runs and hence they 
lie at the heart of the fragility of the shadow banking system.38 The excessive dependence on short-term 
wholesale funding contributed to the spectacular collapse of some of the largest investment and commercial 
banks, such as Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., and Britain’s Northern 
Rock.39 Given the importance of repos in the shadow banking system, it is of special importance to carefully 
examine the market structure as well as the legal structure of the repo markets across the Atlantic to 
highlight their fundamental differences and to bring such differences to the attention of the international 
regulatory fora. 
In the wake of the GFC, the EU repo markets have undergone substantive transformation. For example, 
generally there has been a shift from unsecured funding to secured funding with the concomitant result of 
increasing importance of collateral in financial markets.40 According to the recent data by the FSB, the 
reliance of banks on short-term funding has increased on average in 16 jurisdictions.41 Bank assets funded 
by long-term wholesale assets decreased from 24% in 2011 to 23% in 2015. This pattern has been steeper 
among the Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) whose reliance on long-term wholesale funding decreased 
from 28% of total assets to 22%.42 In the same vein, the net repo positions of banks and OFIs has witnessed 
a spike. This means that the OFIs are net providers of cash to the financial system using repos.43 It seems 
that the reliance of financial institutions on non-bank repos is higher in the US, the FSB suggests that from 
among the 15 reporting jurisdictions, about 59% of non-bank repos are concentrated in the US in late 2015.44 
However, similar trends have been observed in the reliance of dealers on repo financing. Dealers’ repo 
financing was at its peak in 2007 which constitutes 32% of their total liabilities. Since 2007, this figure has 
                                                      
36 Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," Journal of Financial Economics 104, no. 3 
(2012).; Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007. 
37 Financial Stability Board, "Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues- Interim Report of the 
Fsb Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos," (Basel, Switzerland2012), 8. 
38 To see how government extended support to the shadow banking (especially broker dealers) and hence create new sets of 
government-backed shadow banking system, see Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View." 
39 Viktoria Baklanova, Adam Copeland, and Rebecca McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to Us Repo and Securities Lending Markets," 
in Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015), 33-37.; The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States," (Washington, D.C.2011).; Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, and Dmitry 
Orlov, "Sizing up Repo," The Journal of Finance 69, no. 6 (2014). Board, "Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and 
Financial Stability Issues- Interim Report of the Fsb Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos." 
40 Board, "Esrb Opinion to Esma on Securities Financing Transactions and Leverage under Article 29 of the Sftr," 7-8. 





declined and at the first quarter of 2015, it reached a low level of 13% of total liabilities.45 Dealers have 
also extended the maturity of their repo financing.  
Despite serious efforts from the industry and self-regulatory organizations such as ICMA and SIFMA for 
standardization of repo transactions and harmonization of the applicable regime for repos, cross-
jurisdictional differences remain in place.46 There are at least three differences in the repo markets across 
the Atlantic. First, in Europe, a repurchase agreement transfers legal title to collateral from the seller to the 
buyer. In other words, a repo in Europe is a true sale; hence the name ‘title transfer (financial) collateral 
arrangements’ (TTCA).47 Whereas, in the US, under New York law, since transferring title to collateral is 
difficult, the collateral is pledged, however, it is exempt from certain provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code 
that apply to pledges (i.e., automatic stay). In this system, however, the pledgee or the buyer is given a 
general right of use of collateral, which is also known as rehypothecation.48 In spite of this legal nuance, 
this arrangement effectively - and in economic terms - is equivalent to an outright sale. One important cross-
jurisdictional distinction is that under the New York law, repos include a fall-back provision. Namely, if 
the buyer’s right to collateral proves to be unenforceable, the repo will be recharacterized as secured 
lending. However, English law does not include such a provision. 
Therefore, in the EU, in certain settings, it seems that there has been no need for bankruptcy safe harbors 
for repo transaction, because the right of reuse is inherent in the TTCA,49 and such transactions were already 
concluded as a true sale transaction (title transfer) rather than a secured one. However, it seems that due to 
the differential treatments of such transactions in different Member States and potential conflicts stemming 
                                                      
45 Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to Us Repo and Securities Lending Markets," 33-37. (See figure 13) 
46 Industry groups have developed two standard forms for master repurchase agreements. The Bond Market Association has 
published the Master Repurchase Agreement (1996) (The MRA) which is governed by the laws of the State of New York. The 
Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) (Version 1995) is published by Public Securities Association (PSA, a predecessor 
to the Bond Market Association that was the predecessor to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)) and 
the International Securities Market Association (ISMA, Now ICMA) and is governed by the laws of England. The first version of 
GMRA was published in 1992 and since then has undergone several substantial revisions resulting in 1995, 2000, and 2011 
versions. In addition, a Master Securities Loan Agreement (MSLA) of SIFMA in the U.S. is used for concluding securities lending 
transactions. 
47 In Europe, there are both “title transfer financial collateral arrangement” and “security financial collateral arrangement” (Art. 2, 
Directive 2002/47/EC), but it seems that the majority of repos are in the form of TTCAs. For a difference between traditional 
collateralized lending and TTCA, see Joanna Benjamin, Guy Morton, and Michael Raffan, "The Future of Securities Financing," 
Law and Financial Markets Review 7, no. 1 (2013): 5-6. 
48 For the subtleties in the difference between the right of use and rehypothecation, see Financial Stability Board, "Transforming 
Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-Based Finance: Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-Centrally Cleared Securities 
Financing Transactions," (Basel, Switzerland2015). 
49 Manmohan Singh, "Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications," IMF Working Paper WP/11/256  (2011): 9.  
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from such frictions, bankruptcy safe harbors are already included in the Settlement Finality Directive 
(SFD)50 and the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive.51 
The second important difference in the repo markets across the Atlantic is that the US market is dominated 
by tri-party repo the maturity of which is often overnight.52 In a triparty repo market a third party (a repo 
agent) facilitates the repo settlement. Whereas a bilateral repo is directly settled between the two parties to 
the transactions (collateral and cash provider) without the interposition of a third party.53 The estimates 
reveal that two-third of the US repos are in the form of tri-party repos. In the EU, however, only 10% of 
the repos are triparty.54  
The third difference manifests itself in the maturity of repo instruments in the EU and the US. The average 
maturity of US repo transactions is shorter than the maturity of such transactions in the EU.55 In June 2007, 
according to an ICMA survey, only 18.3% of the outstanding repos were overnight in Europe. As of June 
and December 2017, this figure stood at 18.4% and 16.9% respectively.56 However, the US repo market is 
largely overnight.57 This means that the maturity transformation happening through repo transactions in the 
US is higher than in the EU. Hence, ceteris paribus, the US repo markets are more likely to be prone to runs 
and are overall riskier than the EU repo markets.58  
 
                                                      
50 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and 
securities settlement systems, OJ L 166, 11.6.1998. 
51 Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC [2009] OJ 
L146/37 and Directive 2014/59/EU [2014] OJ L173/190. 
52 The maturity of the majority of triparty repos is overnight. See Adam Copeland et al., "Key Mechanics of the Us Tri-Party Repo 
Market," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 18, no. 3 (2012): 21. Most of those repos in the US are open 
(subject to rollover). See Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Öncü, "A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically Important Assets 
and Liabilities: The Case Ofthe Repo Market," International Journal of Central Banking 9, no. S1 (2013): 310. 
53 Copeland et al., "Key Mechanics of the Us Tri-Party Repo Market." 
54 International Capital Market Association, "Frequently Asked Questions on Repo," ed. International Capital Market Association 
(ICMA) (2015). 
There are also additional fundamental differences between the U.S and EU triparty repo markets. See ICMA FAQs, question no. 
24. 
55 Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo," 29-30. 
56 International Capital Market Association (ICMA), "European Repo Market Survey: Number 33 - Conducted June 2017,"  
(October 2017).; "European Repo Market Survey,"  (March 2018). 
57 Association, "Frequently Asked Questions on Repo." 
58 The longer-term nature of repo markets in the EU might explain why repo constitute a higher proportion of the balance sheet of 
key market intermediaries in the EU. Ibid., Question no. 7 (What are the typical maturities of repos?) 
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The fourth and perhaps one of the most important differences concerns the composition of the collateral 
used in the European repo markets. It is estimated that around 80% of the collateral used in the European 
repo markets is government securities. Structured securities used as collateral in the EU markets are a small 
portion of the overall collateral backing repo transactions, and where they are used, they are often used in 
tri-party repo markets. As stated above, tri-party repos amount to 10% of the European repo markets, and 
the use of structured securities as collateral amount to about 10% of the European tri-party repos.59  
In general, jurisdictions where government bonds are prevalent as the collateral in repo are more likely to 
weather the times of repo market distress.60 Given that one of the reasons for the predominance of the repo 
transactions is the supply of highly-demanded safe assets,61 the use of government securities as collateral 
                                                      
59 Ibid. 
60 Financial Stability Board, "Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2017," (Basel, Switzerland: Financial Stability Board, 5 
March 2018). 
61 Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  
(2010).; "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo."; For a different view, see Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, "Global Imbalances 
and the Financial Crisis: Link or No Link?," BiS Working Papers No 346  (2011).; Claudio Borio, "The Financial Cycle and 
Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt?," Journal of Banking & Finance 45 (2014). 
For the concept of safe assets, see International Monetary Fund, "Global Financial Stability Report: The Quest for Lasting 
Stability," (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2012), 81-122. See also, Anna Gelpern and Erik F. Gerding, 
"Rethinking the Law in "Safe Assets"," in Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation, ed. Ross P. Buckley, Emilios 
Avgouleas, and Douglas W. Arner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
Safe assets are described as “a variety of financial claims on public of private sector entities that are used as if they were risk-free.” 
See ibid., 159. 
Gorton et al. describe safe assets as “information-insensitive” or “immune to adverse selection in trading because agents have no 
desire to acquire private information about the current health of the issuer”.  See Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen, and Andrew 
Metrick, "The Safe-Asset Share," The American Economic Review 102, no. 3 (2012): 101. 
 14 
in the EU repo markets is of special importance for the financial stability, because these securities have 
proven to be resilient to runs in the times of crises. As the study by Gorton and Metrick on runs on repo 
backed by Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) shows, during the financial crisis, the major repo runs 
occurred on the commercial paper (ABCP) used as collateral.62 Other studies show that such a run did not 
occur on repos backed by government bonds as collateral.63 Therefore, in the absence of sovereign default 
risk, the risk of a run on the European repo markets cannot be deemed significant. As the financial crisis 
also demonstrated, the EU repo markets weathered the crisis much better than the US markets, perhaps 
because of the reliance of the EU markets on repos collateralized by government bonds. 
Regulatory reforms of repo markets 
Regulatory reforms affecting the securities financing transactions - especially the collateral used in such 
transactions - span across a whole host of regulations having direct or indirect impact on such transactions. 
Rather counterintuitively, instead of the European regulation on transparency of securities financing 
transactions and of reuse (the SFTR regime),64 Basel III and its implementation in the EU by the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV)65 and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)66 (jointly referred to 
as the CRD IV Package) have perhaps had the most dramatic impact on the repo markets.67 Risk-based 
capital requirements, leverage ratio, Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
all have a potential impact on repo markets in terms of increased cost of capital and liquidity for engaging 
in repo transactions.68 The impact is more dramatic in case of leverage ratio and LCR.69 For example, the 
LCR of Basel III makes it costlier for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and their subsidiaries to rely on 
short-term repo funding with low-quality collateral. Basel III NSFR is also adopted to encourage banks and 
                                                      
62 Gorton & Metrick focus on the commercial paper as the collateral used in the U.S. markets, which makes their study irrelevant 
for EU financial markets.; Gorton and Metrick, "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo."; "Regulating the Shadow Banking 
System.". 
63 Shleifer and Krishnamurty suggest that the run only occurred on the repos with ABCP collateral, and not repos backed by 
government collateral. See Andrei Shleifer, "Comments and Discussions (Regulating the Shadow Banking System by Gary Gorton 
& Andrew Metrick)," ibid.; Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo." 
64 Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities 
financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. 
65 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC; OJ L 176, 27.6.2013. 
66 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Of the European Parliament and of The Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for 
credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013. 
67 Hossein Nabilou, "The Eu Framework for Bank Capital Regulation and Repo Collateral," SSRN Working Paper Series  (2017). 
68 International Capital Markets Association, "Perspectives from the Eye of the Storm: The Current State and Future Evolution of 
the European Repo Market," (ICMA, 2015), 10. 
69 Ibid. For example, in addition, the calculations for the purpose of meeting the leverage ratio include leverage obtained through 
repo borrowing. 
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their subsidiaries to rely more on longer-term liabilities and reduce their reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding.70 
Recent studies have found that pursuant to the introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) in 
2012 in the US, repo borrowings by broker-dealer affiliates of BHCs71 has decreased, but the use of repo 
backed by more volatile collateral has increased.72 However, the evidence on this is far from conclusive. 
Some studies suggest risk shifting from broker-dealer affiliates of banks to those affiliated with non-banks 
and heightened amounts of risk due to the use of repos backed by more volatile collateral.73 In addition, 
there is evidence that broker-dealer affiliates of BHCs were discouraged from borrowing in triparty repo 
markets pursuant to the introduction of the leverage ratio. This development was concomitant with an 
increase in the activity of active nonbank-affiliated dealers in certain asset classes entering triparty repo 
markets, suggesting a risk shifting behavior from the banking sector to non-bank sector.74 This increase in 
the importance of nonbank-affiliated broker-dealers in tri-party repo markets has been due to the more 
stringent capital requirements imposed on BHCs at a consolidated level.75 
Although the size of repo markets remains substantial, overall the maturity of repo funding has been 
extended, especially for the repos with low-quality collateral. There has also been a move toward 
diversification of funding sources among dealers.76 Although US dealers and banks have decreased their 
reliance on repo, for US-based foreign bank offices, repo remains a substantial source of funding. This is 
mainly because of differences in regulations as well as the fact that those banks have a limited access to US 
retail deposits.77  
In 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) expanded the deposit insurance assessment 
base from deposits to all of bank liabilities (including repos). This is expected to make it more expensive 
                                                      
70 As a result of differentiated implementation of the Basel III in different jurisdictions, one might expect that divergence in the 
trend in the repo markets will be widened. Since in addition to Supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) in the US, there will be an 
enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) for Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs). It seems that repo markets will 
be shaped differently across the Atlantic in response to the implementation of Basel III requirements. 
71 Major broker dealers in the US are a part of bank holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve. For the complexities 
involved in the US bank holding structures, see Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and James Vickery, "A Structural View of Us 
Bank Holding Companies," FRBNY Economic Policy Review 18, no. 2 (2012). 
72 Meraj Allahrakha, Jill Cetina, and Benjamin Munyan, "Do Higher Capital Standards Always Reduce Bank Risk? The Impact of 
the Basel Leverage Ratio on the U.S. Triparty Repo Market," Office of Financial Research Working Paper  (2016). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 33. 
76 For example, in December 2014, the top three dealers accounted for around 30 percent of the average daily volume in non- 
traditional triparty repo, down from nearly 50 percent in May 2010, when the Federal Reserve started publishing these statistics. 
See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Tri-Party/GCF Repo, available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/data-and-statistics/data-
visualization/tri-party-repo/index.html. See also Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to Us Repo and 
Securities Lending Markets," 33-37. 
77 Ibid. 
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for insured banks to fund their assets in the repo markets.78 In addition, sections 165 and 166 of the Dodd-
Frank Act (enhancing prudential standards for US BHCs) encourage the dealer subsidiaries of BHCs to 
shift more toward longer-term financing. Furthermore, the reforms of the market infrastructure for repo and 
derivatives transactions will also affect the repo markets. This is expected to strengthen the risk 
management by tri-party repo cash investors by incentivizing them to accept more liquid and high-quality 
collateral, hence decreasing the counterparty risk. A trend towards more conservatively collateralized tri-
party repo markets is expected which could lead to a more conservative pricing of credit intermediation by 
repo markets.79 
The case of rehypothecation 
One of the most controversial aspects of repo transactions is rehypothecation or reuse of collateral.80 
Rehypothecation occurs when an intermediary holding securities on behalf of investors grants a security 
interest or encumbers those securities to obtain financing for itself.81 Rehypothecation is often practiced in 
the relationship between broker-dealers and their clients (risk portfolio managers or cash portfolio 
managers) and it provides an inexpensive source of financing for financial institutions, especially broker-
dealers.82 For example, in repo financing, the broker-dealer often hypothecates the collateral provided by 
the risk portfolio manager (PM) so that it can procure financing for the risk PM from a cash PM in a 
matched–book method.83 Rehypothecation plays an important role in providing liquidity to markets. 
However, reuse of collateral is believed to pose risks to financial stability, particularly if one looks at how 
the global financial crisis manifested itself; namely, as withdrawals of collateral from investment banks 
such as Lehman Brothers.84 
                                                      
78 Ibid. 
79 Tobias Adrian and Adam B. Ashcraft, "Shadow Banking Regulation," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, no. 559 
(2012): 42. 
80 It appears that the term rehypothecation would be a confusing term in English law because its commercial use is different from 
its legal use. The word reuse could be a better and more precise term than rehypothecation. For more details, see Daniel Harris, 
"Use of Customer Securities by Uk Prime Brokers: The Road Ahead," Law and Financial Markets Review 7, no. 2 (2013). Reuse 
sometimes is also called repledge. For the difference between rehypothecation and reuse, see Singh, "Velocity of Pledged 
Collateral: Analysis and Implications," 9. 
81 Steven L. Schwarcz, "Distorting Legal Principles," Journal of Corporation Law 35, no. 4 (2010): 699. 
82 Christian A. Johnson, "Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: It's 3:00 Pm, Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?," 
Arizona Law Review 30 (1997): 969.  
83 See Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View." 
84 Duffie, "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks."; Schwarcz, "Distorting Legal Principles," 700.; James Aitken and Manmohan 
Singh, Deleveraging after Lehman--Evidence from Reduced Rehypothecation (Epub), vol. 9 (International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
(showing that the after Lehman bankruptcy there was a significant reduction in rehypothecation by broker dealers. However, this 
reduced counterparty risk in the system came at the cost of having less liquid markets. Singh also finds that the decline in the source 
of pledgeable collateral and the subsequent reduction in the liquidity of the markets had an effect on the conduct of monetary 
policy.) See: Singh, "Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications." 
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The systemic risk concern originates from the uncertainty stemming from a decline in collateral prices and 
potential runs on the counterparties by the firms whose collateral is being rehypothecated.85 For example, 
the counterparty credit risk of prime brokers has always been a concern for hedge funds. At the center of 
such a concern is the reuse of collateral that hedge funds post to secure the funds they borrow from their 
prime brokers. Reusing collateral can increase the counterparty risk in times of financial distress during 
which uncertainty about the counterparty credit risks is in its height.86 It is long established that aggregate 
uncertainty can impair the ability of the private sector to provide liquidity because this sector cannot be 
fully insured against the aggregate shocks.87 Given that rehypothecation of assets can amplify uncertainty 
in financial markets, reuse of collateral may play a role in a liquidity crisis.  
Rehypothecation of collateral is subject to regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, according to 
the section 724 of the Dodd-Frank Act,88 parties accepting money, securities or property to margin, 
guarantee, or secure a swap cleared by a derivatives clearing organization should register as Futures 
Commission Merchants (FCMs). The FCMs should treat all money, securities, and property of any swaps 
customer as belonging to the swap customer. They are also required to separately account for and not 
commingle the customer’s funds with the funds of the FCM. In addition, section 724 requires segregation 
of assets for uncleared swaps. According to this requirement, a swap dealer or a Major Swap Participant 
(MSP) should notify the party wishing to enter a swap transaction at the beginning of the swap transaction 
that it has “the right to require the segregation of the funds or other property supplied to margin, guarantee, 
or secure the obligations of the counterparty.” The aim of this provision is to prevent the swap dealer or an 
MSP from using customers’ assets posted with them as collateral to be used as margin, guarantee, or as a 
security for any of its trades.89 
In addition, in the US the rehypothecation or the reuse of collateral by the custodian or prime broker is 
capped at the 140% of the amount of debt of the client. In other words, the amount of a client’s assets that 
can be rehypothecated by a prime broker or a broker dealer is capped to the equivalent of 140% of the 
                                                      
85 Scott shows how hedge funds can face a prospect of becoming unsecured creditors under UK legal treatment of rehypothecated 
collaterals. See Hal Scott, "Interconnectedness and Contagion," Available at SSRN  (2012): 76-79. In this context, a run by hedge 
funds on prime brokers might occur because of the uncertainty about the health of the prime brokerage firm when the prime broker 
has rehypothecated the collateral. Not knowing where the collateral initially posted by hedge funds to the prime broker is, distressed 
hedge funds might suddenly run to close their positions with that prime broker by grabbing and selling the collateral. This may 
cause serious distress to the prime broker. 
86 In this case, the counterparty does not know where the collateral is, who the right holder on that collateral is, and in case of 
default by the borrower, whether she can take the collateral or not. Such uncertainty can panic several right-holders in adverse 
economic conditions and may generate a run. 
87 Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole, "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 1 (1998). 
88 7 U.S.C § 6d. 
89 Lloyd, Clancy and Kumar, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, pp. 77-79                            
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client’s liability to the prime broker or dealer,90 but such a cap might not be needed under the UK securities 
financing transactions as discussed below.91 
Financial collateral arrangements in Europe is governed mainly by the Directive 2002/47/EC on financial 
collateral arrangements, as amended (Financial Collateral Directive or FCD).92 The main aim of the FCD 
is to harmonize the regime applicable to financial collateral arrangements. The FCD governs the collateral 
provided using title transfer or the grant of a security interest.93 The main provisions include the prohibition 
of the recharacterization of title transfer as grant of security interests,94 right of use for collateral taker,95 a 
mechanism for rapid enforcements including close-out netting,96 and protections in insolvency (bankruptcy 
safe harbor).97 The FCD generally strengthens the position of collateral takers vis-à-vis collateral providers 
and creditors. Such a stance is based on the ground that providing such special treatment would improve 
market liquidity, lead to inexpensive credit and contribute to financial stability by preventing ripple effects 
originating from individual insolvencies. 
At the EU level, on 23 December 2015, the European regulation on transparency of securities financing 
transactions and of reuse (SFTR) was published.98 This regulation contains measures aimed at increasing 
the transparency of the securities lending and repurchase agreements by mandating firms to report all such 
transactions to trade repositories. The SFTR is mainly concerned with the transparency of the SFTs, and 
reuse. Since it is believed that transparency helps increase market discipline and the effectiveness of the 
supervision,99 the SFTR strives to enhance the transparency of the SFTs through the following three 
mechanisms.  
1. The transactions should be reported to a central database (except where one of the parties to the 
transaction is a central bank). This will help the supervisor to better identify the interconnectedness 
of banks and shadow banks.  
2. The transparency on the practices of investment funds engaged in the SFTs and total return swaps 
                                                      
90 Federal Reserve Regulation T (12 CFR §220) and SEC Rule 15c3-3. 
91 Manmohan Singh and James Aitken, "The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System," IMF Working 
Paper 10/172 (2010). 
92 Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC [2009] OJ 
L146/37 and Directive 2014/59/EU [2014] OJ L173/190. 
93 For the distinction between the title transfer financial collateral arrangement and security financial collateral arrangement, see 
Directive 2002/47/EC, Art 2(1)(a), (b) and (c). 
94 Directive 2002/47/EC Art. 6 
95 Directive 2002/47/EC, Art. 5 
96 Directive 2002/47/EC, Arts. 4 and 7 
97 Directive 2002/47/EC, Art 8. 
98 Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities 
financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. (SFTR) 
99 For a different view of transparency in the banking sector and how it can be detrimental to the liquidity in debt markets, see 
Bengt Holmstrom, "Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System," BIS Working Paper No 479  (2015). 
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will be improved by imposing reporting requirements on those operations.  
3. The transparency of the reuse of collateral will be improved by imposing minimum conditions to 
be met for reuse, such as written agreement and prior consent.100  
Therefore, the SFTR requires prior consent for reuse of collateral, and disclosure of risks and consequences 
of reuses to the parties posting the collateral. It subjects the right to reuse of collateral to the notice and 
consent requirements.101 In other words, the receiving counterparty should inform the counterparty 
providing the collateral in writing of the risks involved in consent to a right of reuses of collateral (according 
to Art. 5 of Directive 2002/47/EC) and in concluding a title transfer collateral arrangement, and the 
providing counterparty should grant its express consent to reuse. The establishment of reporting obligation 
to trade repositories, the new disclosure requirements for investments funds and reuse enhance the 
transparency of securities financing markets and will make detailed data available for regulators to monitor 
the risks of shadow banking. 
One of the significant differences in the regulatory treatment of the securities financing transactions in the 
EU and the US is the limit or cap on the rehypothecation of collateral in the US as opposed to many other 
markets including the EU markets. At the EU level, there is no cap on the reuse, as opposed to the 140% 
cap in the U.S.102 However, individual member states such as France have similar limitations (140% cap) 
in place. Although in the UK there is no 140% cap on rehypothecation, it seems that the percentage used in 
the US has created anchoring effect and in fact many hedge funds are using 140% cap as a benchmark in 
negotiating prime brokerage agreements with their banks.103 
Bankruptcy safe harbors for repo 
Another way to regulate repo is through the bankruptcy law applicable to the collateral used in repo, which 
turns out to be another controversial aspect of securities financing transactions and in particular repo. The 
run on repo, as one of the main contagion channels in the GFC, throwed the preferential treatment of repo 
collateral in bankruptcy into the spotlight once again.104 In the US, the collateral of repos and derivatives 
transactions (so-called Qualified Financial Contracts) is exempted from the automatic stay on the 
borrower’s assets in case of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code affords special treatment to derivatives 
contracts by exempting them from the ‘automatic stay’ and allowing counterparties to terminate these 
                                                      
100 European Commission, "Regulation on Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions and of Reuse: Frequently Asked 
Questions," (Brussels29 October 2015). 
101 Article 15 of the SFTR. 
102 Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), "The Reuse of Assets: Regulatory and Economic Issues,"  (November 9, 2016). 
103 Singh and Aitken, "The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System," 12. 
104 Gorton and Metrick, "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo." 
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contracts (by closing out, netting or setting off their derivatives positions) and to seize the underlying 
collateral.105 The repo transactions also enjoy equivalent protections.  
Similar provisions exist in the EU. To mitigate the risk of a run on repo, the counterparties to a financial 
collateral arrangement (e.g., repos) are permitted to terminate the existing positions in the event of default. 
Such protection is intended to become as a ‘firebreak’ to contagion in the event of the failure of a large 
financial institution.106 Therefore, the underlying rationale for this safe harbor for derivatives and repos was 
that such markets can be a source of systemic risk and this exemption would be necessary to prevent the 
risks of contagion and systemic risk.107 
Bankruptcy safe harbors for repos played an important role in the growth of shadow banking.108 However, 
after the GFC, these safe harbors have become highly controversial. It is argued that such protections fuel 
fire sales and collateral crises.109 In addition, the role of closeout and netting in reducing systemic risk is 
far from straightforward.110 In other words, although this exemption produces numerous benefits and is 
necessary for the well-functioning of financial markets,111 it facilitates or encourages the run on financial 
institutions by incentivizing counterparties of the banking entities to close-out or net derivatives contracts 
at the first signals of insolvency of a financial firm. Therefore, this safe harbor does not reduce systemic 
contagion, because it overlooks some intricate incentives lying in the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions. The safe harbors are also considered responsible for the failure of Lehman Brothers, especially 
accounting for the fact that the exemptions from the automatic stay failed to prevent a run on Lehman.112 
For example, just before the collapse of Lehman brothers, JP Morgan seized $17 billion in Lehman’s 
collateral and demanded an additional $5 billion payment.113 
                                                      
105 The Safe Harbor Provisions are embedded in the following provisions: 11 U.S.C. (2018) §§ 362 (b)(6), 362(b)(7), 362(b)(17), 
546, 556, 559, 560 & 561 (2012). In Europe, such safe harbors are granted in the financial collateral directive. See: FCD, Art. 8. 
106 Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral Arrangements [2002] OJ L 168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC [2009] 
OJ L146/37. Recital 17. 
107 See for example, René M. Stulz, "Should We Fear Derivatives?," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (2004): 188. 
108 Gorton and Metrick, "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," 266. 
109 Carolyn Sissoko, "The Legal Foundations of Financial Collapse," Journal of Financial Economic Policy 2, no. 1 (2010). See 
also Steven L. Schwarcz, "Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk," University of Illinois Law Review 
2015, no. 2 (2015). 
110 Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman, "Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout," Journal of 
Financial Stability 2, no. 1 (2006). 
111 For why the derivatives contracts should be treated differently on efficiency-based grounds, See Franklin R Edwards and Edward 
R Morrison, "Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment," Yale Journal on Regulation 22 (2005).; See also 
Philipp Paech, "The Value of Insolvency Safe Harbours," LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 9/2015  (2015). (arguing that 
liquidity is the main value of such bankruptcy safe harbors). 
112 Schwarcz, "Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk." 
113 Duffie, "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks." In addition, this safe harbor also encourages systemically risky market 
concentration on the conviction that on the default of a counterparty, the dealer would simply seize the collateral, making the dealer 
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As it is clear, scholars are divided on a wide spectrum on this contested issue. Some believe that the safe 
harbors should be totally repealed.114 Others believe that they should be maintained in their entirety.115 And 
a third group believes in narrowing down the scope of such safe harbors.116 In general, removing the 
automatic stay exception would act as a curb on repos by reducing the liquidity of the collateral, particularly 
in tri-party markets.117 This could be a sensible regulatory measure to reduce the reliance on lower-quality 
collateral, akin to setting minimum haircuts. However, it would be probably unwarranted for higher-quality 
collateral, such as most government-guaranteed securities.118 
There are various policy proposals for amending bankruptcy law as related to the repo transactions.  Some 
proposals recommend the removal of the exemption from automatic stay for repos backed by risky or 
illiquid collateral.119 Others suggest making repos backed by risky or illiquid collateral subject to tax as a 
macroprudential tool, instead of removing the safe harbor.120 A rather distinct proposal comes from Acharya 
and Öncü who propose creating a special resolution authority called ‘Repo Resolution Authority’ (RRA) 
for addressing the potential systemic risks of repo collateral fire sales during a financial crisis.121 They 
advocate the removal of the bankruptcy safe harbor, except for high quality government bonds. However, 
in the event of default by a counterparty on a repo, lenders should be able to sell the collateral to the PRA 
at market price less a predefined haircut specified by asset class by the PRA. The RRA would then make a 
liquidity payment to repo lenders and then would try to liquidate the collateral in an orderly manner. In this 
case, an ex-ante fee should be charged on repo lenders. Furthermore, there should also be certain eligibility 
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criteria on repo lenders.122 Other proposals put forward a recommendation to impose a temporary stay on 
close-out netting for a short period of time (48h or until 5pm of the next business day). Such a temporary 
stay would allow for benefiting from the risk-mitigation advantage of close-out netting while preventing 
fire sales. However, any modification beyond that has not gained considerable traction.123  
Recently, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)124 revised the regulatory treatment of the 
repo transactions and limited the exemption. As explained above, under the EU law of financial collateral 
arrangements, holders of instruments involving financial institutions whereby cash or securities are 
transferred by way of security are protected from the application of the insolvency laws or other measures 
that could hinder the enforcement of their close-out netting.125 Since such protections result in the erosion 
of the financial institutions goodwill, they were viewed as posing major challenges to insolvency procedures 
and successful resolutions. To address this problem, the FCD was revised by the BRRD to allow for a stay 
on close-out netting and enforcement provision for up to 48 hours.126 This new 48-hour rule is intended to 
afford resolution authorities with adequate time for an orderly resolution. As of this writing, despite heated 
discussions and new proposals in the U.S.,127 there has been no equivalent change in the bankruptcy 
framework of repos. 
In the U.S., as a response to the concerns of run on repo giving rise to disorderly resolution of banks, the 
exemption from automatic stay no longer entirely applies to banks being taken over by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).128 Similarly, under the Dodd-Frank Act, counterparties to a ‘covered 
financial company’129 may not be able to terminate contracts after the institution is put under the FDIC’s 
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receivership.130 To address the issue of moral hazard, Dodd-Frank Act’s section 214 further stipulates that 
taxpayers’ funds cannot be used to prevent financial companies from liquidation, nor should they bear any 
losses in the liquidation process led by the authorities.131 
Shadow banking entities 
Shadow banking entities are composed of a complex web of financial entities, conduits, vehicles, and 
structures in different jurisdictions and are often masqueraded as a whole host of otherwise well-known 
institutions. Such institutions include MMFs, financial vehicle corporations (FVC; i.e., financial vehicles 
engaged in securitization), and other intermediaries such as securities dealers, hedge funds (and to a lesser 
degree venture capital funds), leasing and factoring companies and financial holding companies. Due to the 
limitation of the space, in this paper we only focus on MMFs as one of the most important components of 
the shadow banking system.  
MMFs in the EU 
MMFs are financial intermediaries that connect short-term debt issuers with providers of funds who need 
daily liquidity. In doing so, MMFs can become subject to runs due to their engagement in the liquidity 
transformation without access to government safety nets. In some European jurisdictions, investment funds 
can even originate loans that would entail credit intermediation risk. Bond funds investing in fixed income 
securities are potentially indirectly engaging in indirect credit intermediation and undertaking maturity and 
liquidity transformation.132 Therefore, as far as a fund engages in leveraged credit intermediation (liquidity 
and maturity transformation), they can impose externalities on other parts of the financial system.133 In 
addition, the risk of financial leverage exists in certain types of funds such as hedge funds.134 However, this 
paper only studies MMFs. 
Unlike international initiatives, which propose certain policy objectives and regulatory approaches to 
addressing the potential systemic risks of the shadow banking sector, a closer examination of European 
MMFs shows that they display specific features that distinguish them from the US MMFs, and accordingly 
call for a rather nuanced regulatory approach. According to recent estimates by the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) and under the broad measure, which is based on the investment funds and OFIs, in the fourth 
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quarter of 2015, the size of the shadow banking in the EU was around €37 trillion which amounted to 36% 
of the EU financial sector.135 This estimate stands at around €28 trillion for the Euro area. Between late 
2012 and late 2015, the shadow banking system in the EU grew by 22%. This is in sharp contrast to the 
size of the EU banking system which declined by 5% over the same period. As for the OFI sector, the euro 
area had the largest share of the total OFIs by the end-2015 with assets amounting to $30 trillion. The US 
and the UK are the second and third largest jurisdictions with assets of $26 trillion and $8 trillion 
respectively.136 
According to the ESRB’s broad measure, the largest segment of the shadow banking system in the euro 
area is the investment fund sector. MMFs in the EU amount to €1.1 trillion and non-MMFs amounting to 
€10.3 trillion. Financial vehicle corporations (FVCs) also stand at €1.8 trillion of the broad measure and 
non-securitization Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) amount to €3.7 trillion. 39% of the broad measure is 
categorized as other OFIs that constituting €10.8 trillion composed of heterogeneous entities not covered 
by regular data collection.137 OFIs engaging in the shadow banking activities display a significant 
heterogeneity138 and the data about them are largely lacking. This particularly applies to non-securitization 
SPEs and holding companies, financial corporations engaged in lending, and securities and derivative 
dealers.139  
The most significant difference between the US and the EU MMFs is in the market structure and 
composition of the MMFs. First, the EU has a very small MMF sector that belongs to a heavily regulated 
investment fund industry. The total assets under management (AUM) of the EU MMFs roughly amounts 
to €1 trillion, standing at around 15% of the European fund industry.140 In the euro area, the balance sheets 
of the MMFs only represent 4% of the MFIs’ balance sheets, credit institutions (banks) constitute 96% of 
the balance sheets of the MFIs.141 Therefore, EU MMFs do not appear to be systemic because of their size.  
Second, in most European jurisdictions, such as in Belgium. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
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Switzerland, and the UK, Variable Net Asset Value (VNAV) structures are prevalent.142 Therefore, the 
majority of EU MMFs are VNAV funds which form one of the most striking differences of the EU MMFs 
from their US counterparts. It is estimated that 60% of the EU MMFs are VNAV funds and only 40% are 
in the form of CNAV model.143 As a VNAV MMF is not a suitable substitute to a bank deposit and as it is 
not subject to maturity mismatch and liquidity risks, they cannot even be considered a part of the shadow 
banking system. Overall, this marks a major distinction between the EU and US MMFs in the sense that 
the EU MMFs are less likely to engage in liquidity and maturity transformation, and even if they are 
exposed to maturity and liquidity mismatch risk, it is less likely for them to become systemically relevant 
due to their size. The relative resilience of the European MMFs during the crisis confirms this proposition.  
An additional problem in the MMF sector relates to the sponsor support, which raises concerns about 
interconnectedness. The main problem in the interconnectedness of MMFs with banks is associated with 
CNAV funds. The promise of on-demand redemption at a stable share price (i.e., on-demand par-value 
redemption promise) bears substantial resemblance to the promise made by banks in taking deposits. 
Indeed, a CNAV MMF can functionally be an alternative to a bank deposit especially for investment funds 
and corporate treasurers with sizable amounts of cash under their management. To sustain the promise of 
on-demand par-value redemption, CNAV MMFs have traditionally relied on their sponsor (often a bank) 
for discretionary capital.  
Sponsor rescue may take many forms such as capital support agreements, letters of credit (guarantees), 
management fee waivers or distressed asset purchases at amortized costs. The sponsor support is often 
purely discretionary, i.e., there is no legal obligation on the side of the sponsor to allocate certain levels of 
funds or liquidity for stabilizing the sponsored MMF under liquidity stress.144 However, to avoid potential 
reputational risks of the failure of the sponsored fund, the sponsoring bank often supports the ailing 
sponsored fund by extending credit lines, liquidity support or indemnification in times of crisis.145 
Studies suggest that during the GFC, at lease 21 MMFs would have broken the buck had there been no 
sponsor support.146 Indeed, between 2007 and 2011, in 123 instances, out of a total of 341 MMFs, 78 funds 
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received sponsor support amounting to at least $4.4 billion.147 In Europe, during the GFC, the prominent 
examples of sponsor support was the asset purchase by Société Général and Credit Suisse from their MMFs, 
and Barclays’ extension of guarantees costing £276 million.148 As the below figure suggests, such 
discretionary sponsor support is not a phenomenon of the crisis, but it has been prevalent even before the 
GFC.149 Although since the adoption of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules on MMFs in 
1983 there has only been two instances of MMFs breaking the buck (the Community Bankers US 
government Fund in 1994, and the Reserve Primary Fund in 2008), in the absence of sponsor support, there 
would have been many MMFs breaking the buck.150 
 
The liquidity support by the sponsor to the distressed MMF can expose the sponsoring bank to liquidity 
risks. This increases the probability of the failure of the sponsoring bank. To counter this problem the EU 
MMF regulation151 prohibits the sponsor support altogether.152 The US regulator, however, has taken a 
different approach as it allows discretionary support, but imposes transparency requirements for such 
support. The outright prohibition on discretionary sponsor support is criticized on the grounds that without 
such a support the par-value on-demand redemption promise would be nearly impossible, making the 
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CNAV fund model unsuitable for liquidity management for institutional investors.153 On the contrary, such 
critics argue for the formalization of the sponsor support; a form of transparent mandatory sponsor support 
rather than a discretionary one.154 
In addition to the sponsor support, to address the liquidity issues of MMFs, the EU proposal for the 
regulation of MMFs required the CNAV MMFs (and not the sponsoring bank) to maintain a cash reserve 
(the so-called ‘NAV Buffer’) of 3% of the fund’s assets under management (AUM).155 This was expected 
to reduce the likelihood of the liquidity crisis in a CNAV fund and hence of the actual liquidity support by 
the sponsoring bank. However, after staunch resistance from the industry and market participants, this 
proposal was withdrawn. Eventually, instead of cash reserve requirement,156 the EU MMF regulation tilted 
towards imposing portfolio restrictions on the CNAV funds. 
The interconnectedness of banks to MMFs is not a one-sided phenomenon. In addition to banks’ investment 
in MMFs,157 MMFs are a source of short-term financing for financial institutions. It is estimated that around 
40% of short-term debt issued by the banking sector is held by MMFs.158 Moreover, there is an additional 
international aspect to the interconnectedness of banks and MMFs. Estimates show that the US MMFs 
supply sizable funding to the EU banks, making them vulnerable to the shocks originating from the US 
MMFs.159 
Another source of systemic risk that might arise from the MMFs is the level of concentration in the asset 
management industry. Data show that as of Q3 2015, 84.9% of all assets are managed by 10% of the asset 
management companies in the euro area.160 In addition, the 90% of all AUM is managed by the 130 largest 
asset management companies. The 25 largest asset managers, many of whom owned by banking groups, 
represent 53% of total net assets and 33% of funds.161 There is an additional concern about geographic 
concentration in Europe. More than 90% of the AUM is managed from a few countries such as 
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Luxembourg, Germany, Ireland, the UK, France and the Netherlands.162 By the same token, there is a 
significant disparity across the euro area countries in terms of their contribution to the financial 
intermediation. For example, in Luxembourg, the MMFs represent 27% of the total balance sheet of MFIs. 
This number stand at 24% in Ireland.163  
Even inside the EU, there is a significant level of heterogeneity in the shadow banking entities.164 This 
diversity is especially pronounced in the investment fund sector to which the MMFs belong, and it is to 
such a degree that makes it difficult to include substantial portion of this sector in shadow banking without 
further painstakingly elaborate classifications. Studies by the ESRB shows substantial heterogeneity in how 
differently banks and investment fund sector engage in credit intermediation, and liquidity and maturity 
transformation. For example, a majority of hedge funds acquire leverage using derivatives (i.e., synthetic 
leverage) and their reliance on unsecured debt is minimal. Leverage in investment funds is either on an 
overnight basis or is withdrawable on demand making them subject to runs. According to the ESRB, the 
existing measures of leverage do not capture the synthetic leverage.165 Overall, the main criterion for 
considering investment funds as shadow banks lies in their vulnerability to runs originating from maturity 
and liquidity mismatch and the lack of official safety nets.166 Regulating shadow banking entities as regards 
the investment fund sector mainly targets MMFs and OFIs. In what follows we study the regulatory regime 
for MMFs. 
MMF regulation in the EU 
In 2013, the European Commission presented its proposal for a new MMF regulation, which was adopted 
in 2017 by the Parliament and the Council.167 Contrary to the early suggestions, the regulation does not ban 
the CNAV model. However, the treatment of the CNAV MMFs has been proved to be the most contentious 
issue in the proposal. The proposal contained other controversial issues such as limits on external support 
and the admissibility of investment in other MMFs. In brief, the most important difference between the 
proposal and the regulation is that the final regulation does not contain any reserve requirement for the 
MMFs. 
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The EU MMF Regulation recognizes three different types of MMFs. VNAV MMFs, public debt CNAV 
MMFs and Low volatility NAV MMFs (LVNAV MMFs).168 This regulation imposes certain levels of 
daily/weekly liquidity (portfolio rules) on both short-term MMFs169 and standard MMFs.170 The LNAV and 
public debt CNAV funds are required to hold at least 10% of their assets in instruments that mature on a 
daily basis171 and an additional 30% of their assets maturing in a week.172 These liquidity requirements are 
imposed to ensure that investor redemption could be satisfied in a timely fashion. 
The regulation further imposes a requirement, which has come to be known as ‘clear labelling’ on whether 
the fund is a short-term MMF (holding assets with residual maturity not exceeding 397 days) or a standard 
MMF (holding assets with residual maturity not exceeding 2 years).173 The regulation further requires 
MMFs to use customer profiling policies or the so-called ‘know your customer policies’ in order to help 
the fund to anticipate large redemptions.174 The regulation also requires MMFs to use certain internal credit 
risk assessment by the MMF managers,175 which is devised to discourage MMF to over-rely on external 
ratings. In addition, the regulation imposes certain limitations on exposures to a single counterparty and it 
introduces diversification requirements,176 concentration limits,177 stress testing requirements,178 and more 
importantly it prohibits CNAVs funds from receiving any other external form of support.179 
The proposal for EU regulation contained a cash reserve cushion of 3% for CNAV funds (the so-called 
‘NAV buffer’).180 This buffer could be activated to address the redemptions in times of stress. It could 
operate similar to a buffer to enable the fund to adjust the difference between the CNAV of €1 and the price 
fluctuations of the underlying portfolio.181 This requirement turned out to be the most contentious aspect of 
the proposal. As mentioned earlier, however, it was dropped in the legislative process and could not see the 
light of day. 
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MMF regulation in the US 
Starting from the 1970s, in the US, financial products developed by the MMFs, called NOW accounts 
(Negotiable Order of Withdrawal), were widely accepted as a direct substitute to bank deposits. These were 
the early examples of shadow banking instruments disintermediating the banking entities.182 As of now, US 
MMFs represent more than 50% of global MMFs,183 and CNAV MMFs are effective substitutes for insured 
deposits, and provide continuous liquidity for those institutional investors that have surplus funds and need 
daily liquidity. However, the involvement of the MMFs, specifically the Reserve Primary in the GFC, which 
resulted in its liquidation, was one of the reasons that drew attention to the risks of runs on MMFs and 
triggered their regulatory reform proposals.  
The SEC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have adopted measures on the reform 
of the MMFs and short-term investment funds (STIFs) to address risk of runs. SEC’s 2014 revisions to the 
regime governing MMFs,184 have so far focused on reducing risks on the asset side of MMFs’ balance sheet. 
These reforms require a minimum percentage of assets to be held in highly liquid securities (daily and 
weekly requirements), they further impose restrictions on the purchase of lower quality securities by MMFs.  
According to the SEC rules, there will be three different categories of MMFs: retail (prime/municipal) 
MMFs, institutional (prime/municipal) MMFs, and government MMFs. Retail (prime/municipal) MMFs 
will be priced daily at CNAV of $1.00, and they will be available to natural persons only. Institutions, 
businesses, and other organizations are not eligible to invest in these types of funds.185 They are required to 
impose liquidity fees and/or redemption gates. Institutional (prime/municipal) MMFs will be priced daily 
at VNAV. All categories of investors are eligible to invest in these types of funds. They are required to 
impose liquidity fees or redemption gates. And finally, government MMFs that will be priced daily at 
CNAV, and there will be no restrictions on eligible investors. These MMFs can impose redemption or 
liquidity fees and/or they can suspend redemption (aka redemption gates).186 Although these reforms may 
protect investors, they are assessed as unlikely to address the risk of runs on MMFs.187 
In addition, the SEC rules treat government MMFs (that invest at least 80% of their assets in US government 
debt) and prime MMFs (that invest in corporate debt) differently. According to these rules, government 
                                                      
182 Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
183 Board, "Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016," 21. 
184 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,736 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279) [See 17 CFR 270.2a-7]; Financial Stability Oversight Council, "Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(Fsoc) 2016 Annual Report," (Washington, D.C.: Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2016), 111-12. 
185 For a critique of this classification and restrictions, see Fisch, "The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in 
Money Market Fund Reform." 
186 Retail funds will be available only to natural persons (individuals, certain trusts and retirement accounts). 
187 Adrian and Ashcraft, "Shadow Banking Regulation," 45. 
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MMFs can maintain stable price per share (CNAV), but the prime MMFs should adopt the VNAV pricing 
model. Therefore, the US does not report the MMFs based on CNAV and VNAV classification. In other 
words, in the US, there are two types of major MMFs: government-only MMFs and prime MMFs.188 
Government-only MMFs primarily invest in government securities, tax-exempt municipal securities, or 
corporate debt securities, while prime MMFs invest both in government securities and in corporate 
securities.189  
Due to the differences in the market structure, there are differences in the regulation of the MMFs in the 
EU and the US. As mentioned before, in Europe, there was no regulatory or statutory classification of funds 
based on the portfolio of their investments (government vs. prime funds), instead, the classification relied 
on the fact that whether MMFs were short-term MMFs and standard MMFs. In other words, the US 
regulation differs from the EU regulation in that it differentiates between government MMFs (with 
investment of at least 80% of their assets in US government debt) and prime MMFs that primarily invest in 
corporate debt. MMFs investing primarily in the US government debt can maintain CNAV model and prime 
MMFs should adopt VNAV pricing model.190  
The EU largely follows the same classification, though introducing a new classification of LVNAV funds. 
In the EU, euro or sterling denominated government MMFs are very small (approximately 3% of assets 
managed in the CNAV model).191 Putting this next to the fact that VNAV model is prevalent in the EU, one 
would conclude that the likelihood of runs on EU MMFs is lower as they do not promise at-par on-demand 
redemptions. Despite this, the EU regulation is very similar to the US rules governing the MMFs (SEC 
Rule 2a-7) on liquidity rules, issuer diversification and customer profiling. Such similarity may come as a 
surprise as EU MMFs historically have developed as VNAV funds that do not pose financial stability risks; 
CNAV funds have not been popular in the EU and those are the exact same funds that may pose systemic 
risks. In MMFs, however, the main point of divergence remains to be the regime applicable to the external 
sponsor support. In the EU, such a support is completely banned, while in the US, it is allowed, but subject 
to certain regulatory requirement such as transparency rules. 
                                                      
188 Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View." 
189 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Spotlight: Money Market Funds, last modified: Nov. 3, 2016. 
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Summary and conclusion 
In this article, we argue against one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions for addressing the risks of the shadow 
banking system. Focusing primarily on the EU shadow banking system and contrasting it with that of the 
US, we have demonstrated that not only did shadow banking evolve very differently worldwide, but also it 
substantially differs across jurisdictions in the developed world. A closer examination of the financial 
instruments, activities and entities of shadow banking reveals that the deeper structural differences in the 
EU and the US banking and shadow banking are at the roots of the differences in the development of the 
shadow banking sector across the Atlantic. The traditional bank-based financial system in Europe and its 
reliance on the universal-banking business model has given rise to idiosyncratic shadow banking structures 
in the EU, which is significantly different from the US model of shadow banking.  
Regarding the securities financing transactions, as a major segment of shadow banking activities, despite 
the international efforts to harmonize such transactions at the micro level (e.g., contract design and 
bankruptcy protections), at the macro level, the markets for securities financing transactions remain 
fragmented across the Atlantic. First, while in the US the main mechanism used for securities financing 
transactions is the security financial collateral arrangement, in the EU, it is more likely that a title transfer 
financial collateral arrangement (TTCA) would be used. This would effectively eliminate the need for the 
extension of bankruptcy safe harbors for such transactions. Second, overnight tri-party repos dominate the 
US repo markets, whereas tri-party repos only constitute a small fraction of the EU repo markets. Third, 
the average maturity of US repos is shorter than that of EU repos. Fourth, the EU repo markets are 
dominated by the government backed repos, namely, the collateral used to secure the repo is government 
securities. Fifth, although there is no considerable difference in the regulation governing rehypothecation 
of collateral across the Atlantic, in Europe there is no harmonized limit on rehypothecation. In contrast, in 
the US, such rehypothecation is capped at 140% of the liabilities of the client to the broker-dealer. The rest 
of the regulatory treatment of rehypothecation across the Atlantic remains virtually uniform. Finally, 
regarding bankruptcy safe harbors, by revising the FCD, the BRRD allows for a stay on close-out netting 
and enforcement provision for up to 48 hours,192 which is intended to afford resolution authorities with 
adequate time for an orderly resolution. As of this writing, despite heated discussions and new proposals in 
the US,193 there has been no equivalent change in the bankruptcy framework of repos in the US. 
With respect to the MMFs, first, the EU has a very small MMF sector. Second, within this small MMF 
sector, the VNAV structure is prevalent. Third, the investor base of MMFs in the EU is predominantly 
                                                      
192 See BBRD, arts. 70-71 and 118 that revises the FCD by inserting a new article 1(6) to that directive.  
193 For an overview of these proposals, see Kirshner, "The Bankruptcy Safe Harbor in Light of Government Bailouts: Reifying the 
Significance of Bankruptcy as a Backstop to Financial Risk." 
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composed of institutional investors. Fourth, there is a geographic disparity in the distribution of the MMFs 
in the EU, and it is likely that in certain jurisdictions the MMFs are more systemic than others. Fifth, a 
significant difference in the structure of the MMF industry in the EU and the US relates to the distinction 
between the government MMFs and Prime MMFs in the US. Such a distinctive category does not exist in 
the EU and hence the regulations do not treat them differently. Given the small size of government CNAV 
funds in the EU, there has been no need for introducing a similar legislative categorization to that of the US 
for such funds in the EU. However, the EU regulation introduces such categorization with distinctive rules 
for funds falling under those newly created categories, perhaps in anticipation of the proliferation of such 
funds in the future.  
Based on our findings, we conclude that distinctive features of the EU shadow banking require a 
differentiated and tailor-made approach to regulating shadow banking. We specifically analyzed financial 
instruments, such as repos, which are predominantly associated with the shadow banking, and entities 
typically considered to be at the heart of the shadow banking system such as MMFs, and underlined their 
distinctive features. We conclude that given the substantial differences in all these elements of the shadow 
banking system, regulators, and particularly international standard setters, should be attentive of these 
differences and avoid a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach toward shadow banking. In particular, the 
international initiatives put forward by the FSB and the IOSCO should particularly take note of such 
subtleties in the structure of the shadow banking sector in different jurisdictions before attempting to shape 
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